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ABSTRACT
Stress can precipitate the onset of mood and anxiety disorders. This may occur, at
least in part, via a modulatory effect of stress on decision-making. Some individuals
are, however, more resilient to the effects of stress than others. The mechanisms
underlyingsuchvulnerabilitydifferencesareneverthelessunknown.Inthisstudywe
attempted to begin quantifying individual differences in vulnerability by exploring
the effect of experimentally induced stress on decision-making. The threat of un-
predictable shock was used to induce stress in healthy volunteers (N = 47) using a
within-subjects,within-sessiondesign,anditsimpactonafinancialdecision-making
task (the Iowa Gambling Task) was assessed alongside anxious and depressive symp-
tomatology.Asexpected,participantslearnedtoselectadvantageousdecksandavoid
disadvantageous decks. Importantly, we found that stress provoked a pattern of
harm-avoidantbehaviour(decreasedselectionofdisadvantageousdecks)inindivid-
uals with low levels of trait anxiety. By contrast, individuals with high trait anxiety
demonstrated the opposite pattern: stress-induced risk-seeking (increased selection
ofdisadvantageousdecks).Thesecontrastinginfluencesofstressdependingonmood
and anxiety symptoms might provide insight into vulnerability to common men-
tal illness. In particular, we speculate that those who adopt a more harm-avoidant
strategymaybebetterabletoregulatetheirexposuretofurtherenvironmentalstress,
reducingtheirsusceptibilitytomoodandanxietydisorders.
Subjects Psychiatry and Psychology
Keywords Stress, Anxiety, Depression, Iowa Gambling Task, Resilience, Threat of shock,
Risk-seeking, Harm-avoidance, Vulnerablity
INTRODUCTION
It is well established that stress can precipitate mood and anxiety disorders (de Kloet, Joels
& Holsboer, 2005). However, it is also recognised that there exist great differences amongst
individuals;someindividualsareresilienttostress,whilstothersareparticularlyvulnerable
(Kendler, Kuhn & Prescott, 2004). However, the neural and behavioural mechanisms
underlying such individual differences in vulnerability remain poorly understood. One
potential mechanism by which stress might contribute to mood disorder vulnerability is
via its modulatory impacts on behaviour (Dias-Ferreira et al., 2009; Robinson et al., 2013).
In this study we sought to explore how the impact of stress on behaviour might vary as a
functionofindividualdifferencesinmoodandanxietysymptoms.
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anxiety symptoms. PeerJ3:e770; DOI10.7717/peerj.770We explored the impact of stress on performance of a well-validated financial
decision-making paradigm: the Iowa Gambling Task (Bechara et al., 1994). In this task,
healthy individuals learn to play from ‘advantageous’ decks of cards—which result
in net gains across repeated selections—and to avoid ‘disadvantageous’ decks, which
result in net losses (Maia & McClelland, 2004). To induce stress during this task we
used the well-validated (Robinson et al., 2013; Grillon, 2008; Davis, 2006; Davis et al.,
2010) within-subject, within-session, threat of unpredictable shock paradigm, which has
been shown to increase reliably the psychological (Robinson et al., 2013), physiological
(e.g., startle responding Schmitz & Grillon, 2012; Grillon, 2008; Grillon et al., 1991) and
neural (Mechias, Etkin & Kalisch, 2010; Vytal et al., 2014; Davis, 2006; Robinson et al.,
2012a) concomitants of anxiety, in both humans and experimental animals (Davis, 2006;
Davis et al., 2010). To explore individual differences in stress reactivity, we recruited a
sample of individuals self-identifying as healthy but reporting a range of trait anxiety and
depressionscores.
A small amount of prior work has explored the influence of stress on this task.
Social stress—induced by threat of unprepared public speaking on the Trier social stress
test—hasbeenreportedtoreversetheadaptivebiastowardsadvantageousdecks,triggering
increased selection of disadvantageous decks (Preston et al., 2007; Van den Bos, Harteveld
& Stoop, 2009) (albeit only in some individuals in a complex interaction with individual
differences). Other work has shown that individuals at risk of anxiety disorders (Miu,
Heilman & Houser, 2008), depressed individuals (Must et al., 2013) and individuals
with chronic pain (Walteros et al., 2011) also show an attenuation of this adaptive bias
due to increased selection of disadvantageous decks. However, others reported reduced
selection of disadvantageous decks in individuals with high trait anxiety (Mueller et al.,
2010; Werner, Duschek & Schandry, 2009). What might underlie these discrepancies is
unclear.Giventhecriticalinterplaybetweentraitvulnerabilityandenvironmentalstressin
stress-diathesis models of mood and anxiety disorders (Kendler, Kuhn & Prescott, 2004), it
isimportanttounderstandthedegreetowhichvulnerabilityandresponsetostressinteract
toinfluencedecisionmakingbehaviour.
Based on prior results, we predicted that our healthy sample as a whole would
demonstrate a bias towards avoiding disadvantageous decks at baseline (Bechara et al.,
1994; Maia & McClelland, 2004), and that this bias would reverse under threat of shock
(Prestonetal.,2007;VandenBos,Harteveld&Stoop,2009).Inourkeyexploratoryanalysis
we also examined the interaction between stress and mood/anxiety symptoms on task
performance.Basedonepidemiologicalevidenceforincreasedpathologicalmood/anxiety
symptoms following stress in vulnerable individuals (Kendler, Kuhn & Prescott, 2004) and
prior reports of greater disadvantageous deck selection in individuals with anxious and
depressivesymptomatology(Miu,Heilman&Houser,2008;Mustetal.,2013),wepredicted
thatindividualswithhightraitvulnerabilitywouldexhibitmaladaptiveresponsestostress,
resultinginareductioninthebiastowardsselectingadvantageousdecks.
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Participants
Forty-sevenparticipantscompletedtheexperiment(31female:16male;meanage=22.8,
s.d. = 4.23). Ethical approval was obtained from the UCL Research Ethics Committee
(1764/001). Participants were recruited via responses to an advertisement through the
UCLInstituteofCognitiveNeuroscienceSubjectDatabaseandprovidedwritteninformed
consent. All subjects completed a screening form in which they reported that they were
healthywithnohistoryofpsychiatric,neurologicalorcardiovasculardiagnosis.
Procedure
Stress was induced by unpredictable electrical shocks delivered using a Digitimer DS7A
ConstantCurrentStimulator(DigitimerLtd.,WelwynGardenCity,UK),withanelectrode
secured to the wrist. A shock work-up procedure standardised the level of shock for each
individual.Duringthethreatblockthescreenwasredanddisplayedamessage“YOUARE
NOWATRISKOFSHOCK”whereasinthesafeblockthescreenwasbluewiththemessage
“YOUARENOWSAFEFROMSHOCK”.Participantswereinformed:
•You will alternate between safe conditions, where you will receive NO shocks, and threat
conditions, where you might receive a shock at ANY time. THREAT conditions are indicated
by a RED background, SAFE conditions are indicated by a BLUE background
•The shock is unpredictable and unrelated to your task performance but may come at any
time during the threat condition.
At the end of each block, participants indicated how anxious they had felt during each
of the threat and safe conditions on a scale from 1 (“not at all”) to 10 (“very much so”).
This manipulation check has been used in numerous studies (see Robinson et al., 2013 for
a review). Participants also provided self-report measures of depression (Beck Depression
Inventory;BDI)(Beck&Steer,1987)andtraitanxiety(StateTraitAnxietyInventory:STAI)
(Spielberger,Gorsuch&Lushene,1970)attheendofthesession.
Iowa Gambling Task
We adopted a forced-choice version of the Iowa Gambling task (Fig. 1) which enabled us
to explore choice behaviour for all conditions (Cauffman et al., 2010) (Table 1). On each
trial, one of four decks of cards was highlighted in a pseudo-random order (resulting in a
minimum of 20 opportunities to reject each deck) by a yellow border, and the participant
had to choose whether to play or pass that deck. If they chose to play, the participant
was shown a monetary outcome (win, loss or no change), and a running monetary
total displayed on-screen changed accordingly. If they passed, the next deck was selected
(with no change in the monetary total). If no response was made within 4 s the card was
passed automatically. The probabilities and magnitudes of win and loss outcomes varied
between decks, such that two of the decks provided a net monetary gain on average if
played repeatedly (advantageous decks; Table 1), while the other two decks provided a
net loss (disadvantageous decks; Table 1). Participants played the game twice: once under
threat of shock and once while safe (order counterbalanced) starting with new decks
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Outcomes are added or subtracted from the running total displayed at the bottom of the screen. Subjects
completed one baseline block whilst safe from shock and one stress block at risk of shock (order
counterbalanced).
Table 1 Parameters for the possible monetary outcomes associated with each deck, adapted from
Cauffman et al. (2010). The net outcomes were equivalent to those in the original Iowa Gambling Task
(Bechara et al., 1994).
DECK
A B C D
Range −$250–$100 −$1150–$100 −$25–$50 −$200–$50
Probability of gain 50% 90% 50% 90%
Probability of loss 50% 10% 25% 10%
Probability of zero payoff 0% 0% 25% 0%
Expected value (average
outcome over repeated choices)
−$25 −$25 $18.75 $25
and a hypothetical $2,000 total in each of these two blocks. Each block consisted of 120
trials. Two shocks were delivered during the threat block (after the 13th and 58th trials).
Participantswereshownillustratedtaskinstructionsandcompleted12practicetrialsprior
totheirfirstblockofthetask.
Analysis
Choice behaviour and reaction times were analysed using repeated-measures general-
linear models (with between and within-subjects factors) in SPSS version 22 (IBM Corp,
Armonk, NY). Data from the two advantageous and the two disadvantageous decks were
Robinson et al. (2015), PeerJ, DOI 10.7717/peerj.770 4/12pooledpriortoanalysisresultingintwochoicevariables.Choicebehaviour(proportionof
cardsaccepted)wasthenanalysedin3-waydeck(advantageous,disadvantageous)×stress
(threat, safe) × symptom (depression/trait anxiety as a continuous variable, in separate
analyses) ANCOVAs. Post-hoc analyses were performed using Pearson’s r correlations
between symptom measures and a measure of the impact of threat on choice (threat
minus safe). Reaction time data were analysed in four-way deck (advantageous, disad-
vantageous) × stress (threat, safe) × decision (play, pass) × symptom (depression/trait
anxiety as a continuous measure) ANCOVAs. Note that only N = 42 participants could
be included in the reaction-time analysis as 5 never passed one or more of the decks and
thus had incomplete reaction time data. Trait anxiety (mean = 41, a range = 21–64,
standarddeviation=11)wasnormallydistributed(Shapiro–Wilktest,p = 0.28),butBDI
(mean = 6, range = 0–26, standard deviation = 6) was skewed towards lower values
(Shapiro–Wilk test, p < 0.001) so a square root transformation was applied prior to
analysis. For all analyses, P = 0.05 was considered significant. Based on the meta-analytic
effect size of −0.58 for the Iowa Gambling Task (Mukherjee & Kable, 2014), t-test analysis
in our sample (N = 41) has an ∼84% power to detect an effect size of alpha 0.01
(two-tailed). All data can be downloaded from figshare: http://dx.doi.org/10.6084/m9.
figshare.1257693.
RESULTS
Individual differences and manipulation check
There was a strong correlation between depression and trait anxiety measures (r(47) =
0.74,p < 0.0001).
Subjects rated themselves as significantly more anxious (F(1,46) = 85.3, p < 0.0001,
η2 = 0.65) during the threat condition (mean = 4.7/10, standard deviation = 2.3) than
the safe condition (mean = 1.8/10, standard deviation = 1.2). This was not influenced by
trait anxiety (F(1,45) = 0.004, p = 0.95, η2 = 0.00009) or depression (F(1,45) = 0.42,
p = 0.52,η2 = 0.009)andtherewasnoimpactoforder(F(1,45) = 0.3,p = 0.6η2 = 0.007.
There was no impact of manipulation order on trait anxiety (F(1,45) = 0.2, p = 0.7) or
BDI(F(1,45) = 0.3,p = 0.6).
Choice behaviour
We found a significant main effect of deck type (greater selection of advantageous decks:
F(1,46) = 36.2, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.44) but no stress by deck interaction (F(1,46) = 0.43,
p = 0.51, η2 = 0.009; Table 2). However, including trait anxiety in the model revealed a
significantstress×deck×traitanxiety interaction(F(1,45) = 6.4,p = 0.015,η2 = 0.13)
whichwasdrivenbyasignificantcorrelationbetweentraitanxietyandthestress-triggered
propensitytoplaydisadvantageousdecks(r(47) = 0.336,p = 0.021)butnotadvantageous
decks (r(47) = −0.065, p = 0.66; significant difference between correlations: Steiger’s
Z = 1.96, p = 0.05; correlation with a compound advantageous vs. disadvantageous
deck variable: r = −0.35, p = 0.015). In other words, we observed (along a continuum)
stress-potentiated harm-avoidance in individuals with no/low anxiety symptoms, but the
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Safe Threat
Bad Good Bad Good
Choice 0.656 (0.032) 0.83 (0.019) 0.649 (0.03) 0.843 (0.019)
Play Pass Play Pass Play Pass Play Pass
RT 0.793 (0.039) 0.915 (0.041) 0.779 (0.041) 0.907 (0.052) 0.798 (0.039) 0.902 (0.041) 0.805 (0.044) 0.878 (0.058)
Notes.
RT, reaction time in seconds (standard error of the mean); Choice, proportion of cards chosen from that deck.
opposite pattern—stress-potentiated risk-seeking—in individuals with moderate anxiety
symptomatology(Fig.2).Thiswasseenintheabsenceofatraitanxiety×deckinteraction
(F(1,45) = 1.1,p = 0.31).
Substituting trait anxiety for BDI in the model revealed a similar pattern of results.
Critically,thesignificantstress×deck×depressioninteraction(F(1,45) = 8.9,p = 0.005,
η2 = 0.17) was also driven by a significant correlation between depression scores and
threat-potentiatedtaskperformancefordisadvantageousdecks(r(47) = 0.415,p = 0.004)
but not advantageous decks (r(47) = −0.012, p = 0.94; significant difference between
correlations: Steiger’s Z = −2.1, p = 0.03; correlation with a compound advantageous vs.
disadvantageousdeckvariable:r = −0.41,p = 0.005;Fig.2).Again,nodepression×deck
interactionwasseen(F(1,45) = 1.3,p = 0.27).
Including both trait anxiety and depression scores in the same model resulted in
the symptom × diagnosis × deck interactions becoming non-significant (depression,
p < 0.12;anxiety,p < 0.57)indicatingthatthetwoscalesaccountforthesamevariancein
thissample.
There was a three-way manipulation order × stress × deck interaction (F(1,45) = 12,
p = 0.001, partial η2 = 0.2) as subjects were more likely to avoid the disadvantageous
decks on their second block irrespective of condition. However, this learning effect was
orthogonal to our effects of interest: including order had little impact on the results
(trait; p = 0.012, η2 = 0.14; BDI p = 0.004, η2 = 0.17), and neither did including order
in partial correlations between symptoms and threat-potentiated task performance for
disadvantageousdecks(trait;r = 0.344,p = 0.019;BDIr = 0.419,p = 0.004).
Reaction times
Subjects were faster to play than to pass cards (F(1,41) = 26, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.39) but
therewasnomaineffectofstress(F(1,41) = 0.008,p = 0.93,η2 < 0.001)deck(F(1,41) =
0.33, p = 0.56, η2 = 0.008) or stress × deck interaction (F(1,41) = 0.004, p = 0.95,
η2 < 0.001; Table 2). Including symptoms in the model revealed no stress × deck × trait
anxiety interaction (F(1,40) = 0.256 p = 0.62, η2 = 0.006) or stress × deck × depression
interaction(F(1,40) = 0.02,p = 0.89,η2 < 0.001).
Post-hoc exploration of deck acceptance rates
Someparticipants(N = 5)failedtorejectoneofthefourdeckswheneveritwaspresented.
On the suggestion of one of the reviewers, to explore this further, we divided the sample
Robinson et al. (2015), PeerJ, DOI 10.7717/peerj.770 6/12Figure 2 The effect of stress on participants’ propensity to play cards on threat blocks (proportion of
cards accepted under threat minus proportion accepted under safe) varies significantly with anxiety
anddepressionsymptoms,fordisadvantageousbutnotadvantageousdecks.NBRawdepressionscores
are depicted but data were transformed with a square-root function for statistical analysis.
into individuals who accepted any given deck more than 90% of the time (N = 23), and
thosewhodidnot(N = 24).This‘highacceptance’rate(whichwasalmostentirelydriven
by advantageous decks) showed an interaction with symptoms. Those who accepted any
deck greater than 90% of the time showed significantly lower trait anxiety (F(1,45) = 6.7,
p = 0.012)anddepressionscores(F(1,45) = 9.5,p = 0.003).
DISCUSSION
The current study demonstrates an interaction between sub-clinical mood/anxiety
symptoms and stress-responses on decision-making behaviour. Specifically, we found
opposite stress-responses in those with low—versus those with moderate—anxiety and
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displayed a pattern of stress-potentiated harm-avoidance, whilst those with moderate
symptomsshowanopposingpatternofstress-potentiatedrisk-seeking.
We replicated the frequently reported pattern of harm avoidance on the IGT across
our sample as a whole (Maia & McClelland, 2004). Specifically, across all individuals,
we saw a pattern of increased selection of advantageous over disadvantageous decks.
We did not see, however, the predicted increase in selection of disadvantageous decks
under stress across the whole sample. A close reading of prior findings indicates that this
is likely a replication (Preston et al., 2007; Van den Bos, Harteveld & Stoop, 2009). The
present study nevertheless extends our understanding of the role of stress to show that,
in individuals with low depression or anxiety symptomatology, a baseline harm avoidant
strategy (i.e., increased selection of advantageous vs. disadvantageous decks) is increased
by stress. That is to say, low symptomatic individuals are even more likely to avoid risky
decks under the stress condition relative to their individual baseline. This relative harm
avoidant behaviour under stress may therefore be adaptive. Specifically, in conditions of
threat, it may be wise to seek to minimise further loss. On the IGT this leads to fewer
negative outcomes which, in a naturalistic setting, might mitigate the negative impacts
of stress. One possibility, therefore, is that this pattern of stress-induced harm-avoidance
and reduced anxious/depressive symptomatology is causally linked. Those who respond
in a relatively more harm-avoidant manner to stress might be better at regulating their
environmental exposure to sources of stress, and ultimately reduce their vulnerability to
moodandanxietydisorders.
By contrast, in individuals with moderate symptomatology, the opposite pattern was
evident. Stress provoked a pattern of relatively increased risk-seeking as indexed by
greater selection of disadvantageous decks under stress. This pattern has been observed
in individuals with high mood and anxiety disorder symptomatology (Must et al., 2013;
Walterosetal.,2011;Miu,Heilman&Houser,2008),andinresponsetosocialstressinsome
individuals (Walteros et al., 2011; Werner, Duschek & Schandry, 2009; Preston et al., 2007;
VandenBos,Harteveld&Stoop,2009).Hereweextendandintegratethesefindingstoshow
that this effect is specific to stress-response in symptomatic individuals. On the one hand,
this response can be seen as maladaptive. Subjects appear to be seeking further risk, which
on average will lead to increased losses on this task, potentially increasing stress exposure
in a vicious cycle. On the other hand this might simply reflect an alternative, albeit more
risky, strategy. The disadvantageous decks do actually demonstrate larger occasional gains
(as well as losses; Table 1). So, if a player is lucky, they could potentially more rapidly
improvetheiroverallgains,especiallyiftheyonlyoccasionallysamplefromtheriskydecks.
However, in the long run this strategy will not pay off on the present task and will lead to
increasedoveralllosses.Thisalternativestrategymaythereforedriveelevatedsusceptibility
to pathological symptoms; the more likely an individual is to adopt relatively more risky
strategies, the more vulnerable they are to negative outcomes, associated negative mood
states, and hence mood and anxiety disorders. Indeed, there is some naturalistic evidence
for such a mechanism. Some individuals with high levels of social anxiety demonstrate
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2006; Kashdan, Elhai & Breen, 2008; Kashdan & McKnight, 2010). This may, in turn,
explain some of the discrepancies across prior studies. Trait anxiety, for instance, has
beenshowntobeassociatedwithharm-avoidantbehaviourontheIowaGamblingTaskin
some studies (Mueller et al., 2010) and an opposite pattern of risk-seeking in other studies
(Miu, Heilman & Houser, 2008). Taking into consideration a given subject’s current stress
levelsmaygosomewaytowardsexplainingthisapparentvariability.
It is beyond the scope of the present paper to explore the neurochemical basis of this
effect, but prior work has shown that the anxiogenic effect of threat of shock is thought to
be modulated in part by serotonin and CRH in the amygdala and bed nucleus of the stria
terminalis (Davis et al., 2010; Robinson et al., 2012b). It should also be noted that in the
present study we were interested in the effect of our manipulation on cognitive measures
and as such we did not obtain psychophysiological measures from our participants.
Nevertheless, extensive prior work has shown that the threat of shock manipulation
reliably and reversibly increases startle responding across humans and animal models
(for reviews see Grillon, 2008; Grillon et al., 1991; Davis et al., 2010; Robinson et al., 2013).
Finally, our paradigm is designed as a translational anxiety/stress induction, but it might
be interesting to explore specificity via comparison with other manipulations designed to
elicit,forinstance,angerorhappiness,orwithotheranxietymanipulationssuchasoxygen
deprivation.
This study raises a number of questions. First, is this effect on disadvantageous decks
simply an epiphenomenon of increased current mood disorder symptomatology, rather
than underlyingvulnerability? From our data we cannot determine the causal relationship
between symptoms and stress-induced behavioural change. This question might be
addressed through the use of longitudinal designs that follow-up with subjects and
determine the relationship between stress-induced behavioural change and subsequent
disorder onset. Secondly, why do we see the same effect in trait anxiety and depression
scores? Given that they largely account for the same variance (i.e., including both in the
same model leads to both interactions becoming non-significant) this may be because
both measures tap into the same broad ‘negative affect’ construct. The significant positive
correlation between the measures in this sample provides further support for this as,
indeed, does the observation that depression and anxiety disorders are highly co-morbid
(Kessler et al., 2005). Future work should seek to resolve whether depression and anxiety
symptoms actually represent separate constructs at a mechanistic level. Finally, our
post-hoc analysis of ‘high deck acceptors’ (i.e., those who selected any deck more than
90% of the time) indicates that individuals with lower symptoms might have a greater
propensity to explore possibly advantageous choices in the face of uncertainty (i.e., accept
over 90% of uncertain gambles on advantageous decks). This is, of course, speculative,
but future work may wish to explore whether this has any functional significance: does it
promoteresiliencetosymptomsinsomeway?
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